The extraordinary performance in the U.S. stock market in the latter half of the 1990's has produced record gains in university endowments. In 1998, for example, the five hundred colleges and universities followed by the Chronicle of Higher Education earned average returns of 18%; in 1999, the figure was down slightly at 11%, but still substantial relative to historical norms. (Chronicle, 8/24/2000) . These gains have stimulated considerable discussion on university finances, including debates on spending rates, tuition levels, faculty compensation and the like. Hansmann (1998) , for example, argues that, in the face of these extraordinary returns, university spending rates are far too low and, indeed, that universities are behaving as if their central object is to run investment funds, while operating academic programs on the side.
Similarly, Altshuler (2000) argues for using endowment gains for increased spending on academic programs and faculty salaries as a way to turn financial capital into intellectual capital for the university. At some universities, these endowment gains have created pressures for moderation in tuition increases; Williams in 2000 held tuition constant in response to their positive endowment gains. (Wilgren, 2000) . In recent months, Princeton University has announced plans to convert student loans into outright grants. This paper considers another issue associated with the recent endowment growth: Has this extraordinary growth dampened donor interest in new giving? Do we see the kind of "crowding out" that some have found in government giving to other nonprofit organizations?
(See, for example, Kingma, 1989; Steinberg, 1984) . With market returns on endowments of 15-20%, donors might well believe universities no longer need their money. Indeed, there is some indication that Harvard worried about just such an effect in its recent capital campaign.
Susan Feagin, former vice-president of development at Harvard, indicated, "there was a lot of concern for how a $2 billion campaign would be perceived. Would it look greedy?"(Quoted in Pulley, 1999) . To the extent that high endowment levels induce a form of self-correcting restraint on the part of donors, the argument in favor of new spending initiatives is reduced.
A first cut look at the aggregate time series data seems to run counter to the crowding out hypothesis. Gifts to universities have grown rapidly in the latter part of the nineties, paralleling the endowment growth. The total giving to colleges and universities in 1998-99 was twice that reported in 1990-91. (Lively, 2000) . Post 1995, aggregate giving increased by double digits every year. (Lively, 2000) . A simple comparison of endowment growth and portfolio performance, however, can be quite misleading. The same stock market growth responsible for healthy returns on university endowments improved the portfolios of potential donors during this period. Richer alumni naturally donate more to their alma maters. The right question for us to ask in assessing the crowding out effect is a marginal one: holding donor wealth constant, what is the effect of growing endowments on giving behavior? The aggregate time series data simply do not let us sort out the effect of donor wealth growth from endowment growth. This paper instead relies on cross sectional data to try to disentangle the donor wealth growth from endowment growth. In any given year, universities experience quite substantial differences in portfolio performance. In 1999, for example, the Princeton endowment grew by almost 16%, while Emory's actually fell by 12%. (Chronicle, 2/18/2000) . At the same time, there is no a priori reason to expect that donors to Princeton and Emory experienced radically different returns on their personal investments. Thus, in theory at least, it should be possible to use university differences in portfolio performance to examine potential crowding out.
Earlier work on the crowding out effect has focused on the effect of government spending on contributions, looking at a variety of different nonprofit organizations. What happens to the level of private contributions as government increases its funding of nonprofits? Or, in a more modern context, will private donations make up for cut backs in government funding? In this context, prior literature has found relatively modest crowding out effects (Steinberg, 1987; Roberts, 1984; Kingma, 1989) . A recent study of the interrelationship of donations and commercial revenue using a fixed effects model finds no crowding out in the university setting; indeed, in this industry, the two revenue sources appear to be complementary. ( Segal and Weisbrod, 1998) . That is, for universities, donations and commercial revenue appear to move together. On the other hand, one might well expect that potential donors would be more aware of endowment growth than they are of commercial revenue, giving rise to stronger crowding out effects from this avenue.
Prior work on crowding out traces the effect of new revenue sources on aggregate donations. In the case of universities, we may see a subtler, compositional effect: endowment growth may affect the kinds of donations made. University donations come in a range of forms, large and small, from varied sources, carrying greater or fewer restrictions. In 1998 in a sample of colleges the Council for Advancement and Support of Education found that 57% of the donations raised came from just one percent of donors. (Pulley, 1999) . Approximately 30% of the college and university donations come from alumni, and another 25% from other individuals, with the remainder coming from foundations and corporations. (Chronicle, 5/5/2000) . It is likely that endowment growth will affect these different levels and types of donors differently.
In 1999, roughly 88% of the donations to the colleges and universities tracked by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE) were restricted. In the last decade, an increasing share of gifts to educational institutions has been restricted. Restrictions on the use of donations can have substantial effects on a university's ability to move in directions favored by a current administration and any tendency for such restrictions to rise are potentially problematic from the 5 point of view of the university managers. Large restricted donations leave universities especially vulnerable. In this paper, I explore the changes in the balance of restricted and unrestricted funds, and the composition of donors, using both cross sectional and time series variation to see if there is any effect from endowment growth.
1.
The Model
Donor Behavior
We begin with a simple utility maximizing model of donor behavior, as below, similar to the model used in a range of earlier work. (See, for example Steinberg, 1987) .
Where U i is the utility of donor i, and depends on private consumption, C i , D i , the contributions from donor i, and a vector of services , S, provided by the nonprofit to which the donor is contributing. The S's represent the "public good" piece of university programs. In contrast to earlier work, I have modeled this as a vector of goods, to enable us to think about differences in donor preferences around the various services of the university. Some donors, for example, might put a high value on academics, while others are more interested in athletics. All of the components of the vector are public goods, but the marginal utility of each component might well vary to the individual.
As we see , in this specification, donations are motivated by both private and public goods concerns. In the first instance, donors get direct utility from their own private donations, gains which Andreoni (1990) refer to as the "warm glow effect." On the other hand, donors also recognize that the university can use their contributions to create a stream of public services, which are themselves valued by those donors. Those services, S I …S n , are produced by the university using three sources of funds: donations, tuition revenue and endowment income. In this respect, donations substitute in production for donations of others as well as for income from endowments and other sources. As Andreoni (1990) and others have suggested, the stronger the direct private good gains from donations, the first element in the utility function, the less strong will be the crowding out effect . Indeed, as Steinberg points out, donations may act as complements to other revenue sources in their private guise, if the warmth of the glow from giving increases with the scope and depth of the university. (Steinberg,1987 ) . It is in the production of the S vector that we see the potential for crowding out. 1 In this production function, donations and endowment serve as substitutes, and we should expect endowment growth to "crowd out" donations, at least at some level.
The specification above also suggests a potential compositional effect from endowment growth. Two effects are likely. On the one hand, donors may vary in the relative public/private source of their utility from giving. For example, one might well expect board members to exhibit strong "warm-glow" effects , and thus show relatively little crowding out relative to other donor types. On the other hand, donors who impose restrictions on their gifts may be more production oriented and thus more easily crowded out than more general purpose donors. Even donors who are principally interested in the production side may differ in their response to other revenue growth, depending on how substitutable they think general university funds are for their donations. A donor who wished to build Yale University another world-class squash facility might well believe that absent his or her funds, no university funding would go towards this purpose.
For this donor, though the focus of the charitable interests is on the production of university services, the esoteric focus of the charitable interest would likely reduce crowding out. Corporations and foundations, who often have a more well specified quid pro quo, may in fact exhibit less crowding out, given likely lower elasticity of substitution between their funds and other university support. We will explore some of these compositional differences as well in the empirical work in this paper.
The University Side: Administrators and Fund Raisers
The simple utility maximizing model of donations treats the fund raisers of the university as passive agents. . Again, the real issue is a marginal one: holding donor wealth constant, does endowment growth discourage development efforts? In some ways we are asking whether the supply of development activity is "backward-bending."
One might also see compositional effects operating from this side of the market.
To the extent that there is some cutback in development effort, presumably it is the lowest return efforts, which are abandoned. These abandoned prospects may well look quite different from the remaining pool. We will also explore this effect.
The Data

Sources:
The data on charitable giving for universities and colleges used in this paper come from the Voluntary Support of Education (VSE) Survey program developed by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE). The CAE, an affiliate of the Rand Corporation, collects data annually from a large sample of colleges and universities, as well as a number of independent schools. In 1999, the sample consisted of 938 higher education respondents, including both two and four year institutions. The data are self-reported, and include a quite detailed range of both source and type of gift. Data are also collected on both enrollment levels and the market value of endowment. The first empirical work in this paper uses the responses of four-year colleges and universities in the 1999 data set.
The VSE data are also available for a time series of colleges and universities, beginning in 1980. This large data set includes somewhat different categories of giving than the 1999 data, and many colleges do not have a full set of data, with some joining the survey late and others dropping off. Nevertheless, this is a very rich data set and the second part of the empirical work is based on this panel data.
The Aggregate Picture
Before we turn to the empirical work, it is useful to look briefly at the overall picture of college giving provided in the VSE data. Figure 1 describes the trends in voluntary support per student in the 1980-1999 periods for the VSE sample for four-year institutions.
While these gifts have increased in current dollars over the whole period, most of the growth has actually been in the very recent period. Indeed, in the latter part of the 1980's and through the early 1990's, constant dollar contributions per capita fell slightly. This pattern is consistent with the common view that much of the recent growth is stock-market driven, rather than a reflection of a more fundamental taste change on the part of donors. It also suggests that the search for any possible crowding out effects is likely to be most revealing in the very recent period. Table 1 provides some detail for the full VSE sample of four-year colleges and universities on the composition of the 1999 gifts. The largest source of funds is alumni giving, followed by nonalumni individual giving. Gifts are more or less equally split between capital and current operations, and the share of unrestricted giving is relatively low. 
The Empirical Results
Overall Giving
The first question this analysis addresses is whether university giving is negatively affected by endowment growth: Is there crowding out ? We begin by looking at the 1999 data.
There are two strands of prior literature looking at the determinants of university giving. A number of articles, including most recently Rhoads and Gerkins (2000) Weisbrod actually find complementarities between donative and commercial revenues, in the university setting, which they argue reflects scope economies across these functions.
Even casual inspection of the data suggests that colleges and universities differ quite dramatically in their base level of giving. There are three approaches used in this paper for dealing with these differences as we move forward in trying to identify any crowding out. Approach 1 is to try to identify some , hopefully exogenous , variables which adequately explain the differences across base levels of university giving and then In what follows, all three approaches are used to analyze crowding out.
Unfortunately, the panel data runs only through 1997, and thus do not contain the period of really high endowment growth that we see in the 1999 data. In addition, the 1999 data allows us to look at some of the compositional issues in a more thorough way, so that again, we will not have the full benefits of parallel analysis.
Approach 1: Cross Sectional
The first part of the empirical analysis looks at the effect of endowment growth on voluntary giving to four-year colleges and universities, using the 1999 data set. The model to be estimated is:
1.
Where Y i is the log of contributions per student for university i in 1999, the Z ij 's are a set of variables that differ across colleges, and X i is the endowment growth for university i. The use of logs follows the literature and reflects the fact that we would likely expect changes in the explanatory variables to have a fixed proportional effect .
The results of estimating equation 1 are given in Table 2 . The dependent variables include three categories of giving: total giving, alumni giving and nonalumni individual giving. All variables are measured as logs, per capita. In the sample, the mean total giving per capita is $4357; as calibration, we note that Amherst College generates just over $25000 per student. In the sample, alumni giving represents 30% of the total giving, which is in line with overall estimates.
The right hand side variables, the Z's, used in the first regression include dummies for type and quality of institution and enrollment levels. Prior work suggests that public institutions have substantially lower giving per capita than private, suggesting that we should find a negative coefficient on the public/private dummy. The remaining dummies are indications of whether the institution is: a university ranked in tier 1, or tier 2; or a college, ranked in tier 1 or tier 2. The ranking figures are taken from U.S. News and World Report, 1998 rankings. Lagged rankings were used to reduce endogeneity problem. Enrollment levels were included to test whether the likely free rider effects in college giving increase with size; the expected sign in this case would be negative as large size causes a decline in per capita giving. After eliminating all two-year colleges from the sample, and taking account of missing observations, 700 universities and colleges remained in the sample.
The variable of central issue in this paper is endowment growth. In Table 2 , endowment growth is defined as the change in the value of the endowment over the twoyear period 1995 to 1997. Lagged returns were used to reflect the fact that fund raising likely responds to past performance. The mean return on endowment over this period is 43%, for the two-year period. Endowment returns vary considerably across institutions, however. A simple regression on these data, however, suggests that returns are not a function of endowment levels.
The regressions reported in Table 2 were estimated using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. (White, 1980) . All of the independent variables have the expected sign except the enrollment variable, which was essentially zero. The ranking variables are highly significant and the ordering makes economic sense. That is, having a rank as a tier one school increases giving more than a tier 2 ranking, but tier 1 and tier 2 ranks perform better than the unranked, omitted group. In the case of alumni , per capita giving is highest among tier 1 colleges, which is consistent with one's intuition about the loyal alumni of top ranked liberal arts institutions. Most significantly, all three regressions indicate a highly significant crowding out effect, with somewhat stronger effects on the alumni giving equation. All three regressions have reasonably good fit as well. Table 3 reports the results of this regression, again using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. The regression was run only on the total giving category. The number of observations shrank modestly given missing data for the 1995 period. The results are consistent with those in Table 2 . As expected the lagged giving is highly significant, and less than 1 , which is consistent with the aggregate time trends (i.e. , for most schools giving has increased between 1995 and 1999). The fit of the regression is strong. And, as earlier, we see a significant crowding out effect. In the first two sets of regressions , we used the 1999 giving data to estimate the crowding out effects . The results suggest that in the 1999 period, after almost a decade of strong endowment growth, there appears to be some crowding out of new donor dollars. We turn now to the panel data to see whether or not there is evidence of crowding out in the earlier period covered by these data.
Approach 3: Fixed Effects
The VSE panel data contain information on various categories of giving for just over 1,000 four-year institutions, from 1980 to 1997. There are also data on endowment values for most of the institutions for most of the years, as well as enrollment data. On the other hand, we do not have the ranking data for this full period, which was independently collected for the earlier data set. For the panel data, the approach instead was to estimate a two-way fixed effects model, collapsing all of the differences across the universities and colleges into a single term. The fixed effects model was used to control both for the specific university characteristics which might influence its giving patterns as well as the year effects. The fixed effects model is equivalent to running a separate constant term for each university. Essentially, we are abstracting out from the kinds of university features which we included in the Table 2 regressions. The coefficients on the remaining variables estimated can thus be thought of as the effect on per capita giving, holding university and year constant. The underlying assumption of the fixed effects model is that the university or college constant stays the same over the period.;
to the extent that one believes that academic reputations and strategies are more variable than this, the fixed effects model may be problematic. In this case, the first approach which tries to correct for those changes will be preferable.A Hausman test rejected the random effects model. (Hausman, 1978) . Table 4 reports the results of a one-way and the two-way fixed effects model on the log of per capita giving by three categories: total giving, alumni giving and parental giving. As earlier, the log specification is used. As earlier, the endowment growth is lagged one year. As a result, the 1980 and 1981 observations are lost. Dummies are used for each year and are reported on the table. The results are quite striking. While the one-way fixed effects specification, accounting only for the year differences, suggest crowding out effects, much as the earlier regressions did, in the two-way fixed effects model, these effects go away. The difference in the two regressions reported in Table 4 suggest that unobserved heterogeneity among schools is an important feature of the model. Of course, this is not surprising given our earlier results. That is, the results of Tables 2 and 3 suggest that there are, in fact, considerable differences among colleges and universities in giving behavior. In the earlier regressions, we captured these differences either through identifying variables or through the use of a lagged variable. Here, the school fixed effects capture those differences. The year dummies are significant and sensibly signed, with a strong-though not monotonic-upward trend over the period. 
t-statistics in parentheses
Clearly the two-way fixed effects model using the panel data tell us a different story from that told by the cross sectional data. In the earlier period covered by the panel, no crowding out is apparent in any of the giving categories once one accounts for both college and year effects.
There are two plausible explanations for the observed differences. On the one hand, the time period difference may be important. Public interest in the phenomenon of growing endowments by academic institutions seems to have grown in the last few years. Note the recent articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education cited earlier, as well as the very recent moves by colleges like crowding out until quite recently. Of course, the difference in the results may also reflect the methodological differences; the fixed effects model may simply be doing a better job of removing university heterogeneity. Recent work by Rhoads and Gerkins (2000) on whether or not athletic success affects contributions finds a similar reduction in the crowding out effect when one moves to a fixed effects model. We note the two-way fixed effects model is itself vulnerable to changing school effects.
Compositional Effects
The model of fund raising developed in Section 2 of this paper suggests that the crowding out effect may affect some donor groups more than others, giving rise to a compositional effect.
In particular, on the donor side, the model predicts that endowment growth will have its smallest effect on the "warm glow" donors who are giving principally as a private good matter. The model further suggests that, of the donors who are giving to induce production of a set of university services, those with preferences most orthogonal to those of the college administrators will be least crowded out. On the fundraisers' side, we expect crowding out to work from the bottom up, shrinking the most expensive, least productive fund raising activities first.
Of course, it is not easy to identify the "warm glow" donors. As a general matter, however, one might expect the very large donors to be disproportionately in this class. Moreover even when very large donors derive utility principally from the public good/production side, of their gifts, the very size of their gifts often reduces crowding out as displacement is less likely.
Very large gifts have the capacity to change university-funding priorities in ways that small gifts cannot and many donors recognize their power. Thus, one might expect large gifts to increase in importance as endowments grow. In fact, there is evidence at the broad level which supports Of course, the compositional shift noted above, while interesting , may well reflect other things going on in the economy, for example, the differential wealth growth among high-end donors due to the stock market. The same can be said for a number of the other changes we see in university giving. The decline in corporate giving is likely due at least in part to a reclassification of corporate cause-related gifts as marketing expenses. The increase overall in restricted giving may reflect some decreased trust on the part of donors. As in the trends in total giving, one needs to focus on the marginal effects in looking at crowding out. We turn now back to the 1999 cross sectional data to see what we can learn about the effects of endowment growth on various categories of donors. The results in Table 6 do indicate a significant effect of the expected sign. The share of giving which is restricted falls with endowment growth across the sample of colleges and universities, again holding constant a vector of institutional characteristics. We note again that endowment growth is not correlated with endowment size in this sample. It is also interesting to note that being a university increases the likelihood that funds will be restricted, which is consistent with the view that the breadth of university activities increases the desire of donors for control. Public institutions also seem to get a disproportionate share of restricted funds, perhaps in part as a reaction against crowding out by government dollars. The second two columns of Table 6 provide further evidence of the compositional effect by looking at two specific categories of restricted giving: giving to athletics and giving to academics. I would argue that academic administrators in general have less of a taste for athletic funding than their avid alumni, but no such great divide is apparent in the academic side.
If true, this suggests that donors to athletics will perceive a lower elasticity of substitution between their funds and overall endowment funds when it comes to their pet projects, than more general academic funders. This , in turn, would lead to less crowding out for athletic dollars than academic. And, indeed, this is the evidence provided in columns two and three of Table 6 . The regressions provide no evidence of crowding out of athletic donations, while the academic donations again are reduced in response to endowment growth.
As a last piece of analysis, we look at the trends in corporate giving across the universities. While corporate giving has declined somewhat over the last decade, it remains an important part of the fund raising of most colleges and universities, comprising on average almost 20% of total fund dollars. Most corporate funding , however, is highly restricted, often going to a particular project. As one university fundraiser at the University of Wisconsin at
Madison observed about their high reliance on corporate giving: "The department of Slavic Studies and the philosophy department tend not to have major donors throwing money at them."
(Quoted in Pulley, 1999) . Given the narrow focus of corporate giving and the quid pro quo character of most gifts, one would expect little crowding out. And, indeed, that is precisely what we find in Table 7 . While institutional variables matter a good deal in the levels of corporate funding, with top tier universities well ahead of the pack, endowment growth has no effect on this giving. Regressions were estimated white corrections for heteroskedasticity *indicate significance of the .01 level using robust standard errors. t-Statistics in parentheses.
Conclusion
The higher education industry finds itself in an enviable position in the first part of the new century. We offer a product which is in relatively high demand, not only to our own American students , but also increasingly to the international market. We are almost uniquely able to use fine-grained price discrimination to manage different demand elasticities of our customers. While historically we have had relatively low productivity growth, at least as measured by student/faculty ratios, recent improvements in distance learning technology may even improve that picture. Finally, the industry has experienced record increases both in the returns to their endowments and levels of charitable giving, allowing institutions of higher education to undertake substantial new projects. At Yale, for example, decades of deferred maintenance have been remedied due to the combined largesse of the market and our alumni.
But in these boom times, there is a specter of a backlash. One cannot help but note an increase in the number of articles complaining about the growing wealth of the university. My results suggest there may well be a very recent adverse response in the giving levels to university affluence. If the consequence of today's increased wealth is a reduction in the habit of giving of traditional donors, then universities which have made important, and hard to retract changes in faculty compensation, scholarship programs, and tuition levels , may well find the future more difficult. Similarly if that endowment growth creates a shift in the relative generosity of various groups of donors, this too must be taken into account by university administrators.
